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Does selecting a taxpayer for audit violate civil rights—a critical analysis of the Pakistani High Court's decision?

Najeeb Memohand Christian Lorenz

Abstract

This paper deals with taxpayers' selection for tax audit undeSetteAssessment Scheme (SASTax administrations across the world are continuously striving to improve the quality of taxpayer selection for **Attein**, the one who gets selected askswhy me? Recently, the Lahore High Court (LHC) in Pakistan has held that selection for audit by field officers, being discriminatory, violates the civil rights enshrined in the Constitution of **Pakistam** as equal protection under law for all citizes. This papereviews international best practices **aimd**s that tax agencies, through collaboration of central and field officers, use both objective and subjective criteria in the seleAttern through tax agencies in various jurisdictios are given leverage to select any taxpayer for audit and the courts there do not hold such selections unconstitutional. A critical analysis of the LHC decision in this paper finds that it suffers from legal and rational fallacies because it has ignored at autonomy given by the superior courts of various jurisdictions for discriminating citizens in taxation if that has a reasonable basis and helps in securing tax objectives such as redistribution of income

Keywords: Taxpayer audit, Selection quality, Civil righSelf Assessment Schen(SAS)

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legal jurisdiction to interfere in the internal distribution of work in tax administration Although the division of functions in an organisations important to prevent concentration of authority in the

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is of being caught, the lessamethe tax evasive practice¹⁴. Evading taxes is kind of gambling with the tax authorities The risk or deterrence of being caught are ing money needs to be higher than the expected gain tax evaluated by the State Bank of Pakistan found that lack of audits as responsible for poor tax collections in the years immediately after he introduction of the SAS in 2003. Further negative growth of collections on demand occurrefuer 2003 when audits ceas¹⁵

Correct selection of audit subjects alsoptimises resource allocation of the tax administration because every taxpayer indiscriminately cannot be subjected to audit due to resource constraints. Studies show that the greater the specificity in identifying the cases the lessbe number of selected cases.

3. REVIEW OF PROCESS AND QUALITY OF SELECTION FOR AUDIT UNDER THE SAS

Although most tax regimes in developed economies have shifted to the SAS for

More broadly, strategic risk management is done in the central offices of tax administration whereas theocal selection process is carried out by the field formations When the central and field offices operate in symoth, rsynergy develops and the selection process produces better results. In practice, however, most selections are lecentralised ³⁶ Some examples of developed tax jurisdictions follow so as to provide better understanding of the role of central and field offices of tax administration in selection of cases.

In the US, theinternal Revenue Servi¢ BRS) and Discriminate Function (D), Fwhich does macroeconomic statistical analyeisserate together to obsecases for audit. The US uses highly specise Centralized Examination Classification Systems (CECS) for macro level analysis. Beyond that, the review of selection by states of Florida and Columbia show that personal observations are predominated for selection.³⁹

In Canada two tiers of tax administration are involved in the selection of deises the central office performa statistical analysis and then the experienced auditors examine that data and using local knowledgeselect cases for aud¹⁰. Local knowledge plays adecisive role inaudit selection⁴¹. France and Japan also use collaboration between central and field offices for selection of dates.contrast the UK selection of cases for audit collectively or independently lines three tiers of tax administration

New Zealand (NZ)has a Taxpayer Audit Selection System (TASS) whereby some cases are picked on the basis of selected que**Tibes**e cases are then exported to individual investigators for further scrutinise the returns The investigators can also seek help from compliancerisk officers (CROs) bellSan ke i i. (r)-2 (t(c)9.2 fw 0.8487 (s)

to pick the cases for audit in order to encourage taxpayeu8yt comply with the tax code.

4. SELECTION PROCESS UNDER THE PAKISTANI TAX CODE

In order to understant the evolution of selection of taxpayer's audit, the gal framework under the repealed ordinant recome Tax Ordinance 1979 and the new ordinance lancome Tax Ordinance 200 is visited in the following sections

4.1 Repealed ordinance

Unders 59 of the repealed ordinan⁵tenon-corporate taxpayers were provided waith self-assessment/which was very liberal The acknowledgment of filing of return was deemed as an assessment ord@mly some cases were selected for audit by the central tax authority or its subordinate authorities by any method, which was prescribed by the central office More simply, the rethod or scheme of selectionas made part of the legal framework of the tax authority the selection, under the statute, was domain of the central office with no or little role for the case managers.

4.2 New ordinance

The legal framework under the rep2 (n)2 (d)MCID 5 >>Bhameewanreg(r)-2 ew the ste onf r

requirement This indicates that the authority of selection for audit is compatively constrained in Pakistan as both central office and case managers have to officially disclose any easons.

Further, the reasons, which are

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The court, however, has failed to explain how a civil or a criminal audit started with valid reasons by a statutory agency could cause interference using as a legal inquiry could obstruct a axpayer carring on their lawful business or profession. In this case the taxpayer will have been provided with a their rights during the audit process and no prejudice may be caused to the forme or even after the conclusion of the audit. The taxpayer also has the right to appegnatinst the outcome of the audit before various appellate authorities may the Commissioner (Appeals) to the process of the court. Further, the court has also failed to appreciate that the SAS puts flass

In its pronouncement theourt also failed to take into accoutive important aspects First, the SupremeCourt of Pakistan has already stated telemenst of discrimination in a fiscal statute cannot be pleaded norscarch a statute be struck down on blassis of Article 25 of the Constitution. As a result, there are many examples where various incomes, persons and industrial sectors are taxed differentiation income is not from manufacturing is subject tax in Pakistan while agricultural income is not effective taxationsuperior courts in India havellowed varying tax regimes for different classes of persons based reasonable and rational differentiation. The Supreme Court also mentioned that progressive taxation taxes citizens differently at varying levels of income for the sake of public welfare and remove economic disparity.⁷⁴ Thus we can see that equality of all citizens under Articles is violated whercitizens are taxed in such a way tasachieve economic equality

More specificallya62 (i>>BDC 204 -0 0 11.04 5002 Tw ID 1 >>BD204 -9f .3 ()-4.6n 0 T

formation for selection is essential due to the nature of this function which involves the use of taxpayer specific informationbatth levels In addition the processes of selection of cases and performance of audit should be totally transparent in order to develop trust between taxpayers and taxe administration Further, for any tax administration to operate efficiently and honestly some prerequisites such as sufficient skills, high remuneration, appropriate performance evaluation mechanisms and suitable internal controls are mandatory in general and necefoscathe success of SAS in particular

In terms of making the criteria for taxpayer selection flexible in Pakistan, it is suggested that ss 177 and 2) 4 (hould be accordingly amended.heTcriteria for selection should not be provided in law and function of dsigning criteria should be delegated to the tax administration so the tax intervention of dsigning criteria should each year in accordance with the facts of that.year noted above and seen in the good practices of developed countrilestter selectionelies on collaboration between the central office and field formation such collaboration ensurthe optimum use of teensrally propared data Tripety disservent to collaboration (the data) Tripety disservent to collaboration ensure the optimum use of teensrally propared data) Tripety disservent to collaboration ensure the control of the data) Tripety disservent to collaboration ensure the optimum use of teensrally propared to the data) Tripety disservent to collaboration ensure the control of the data) Tripety disservent to collaboration ensure the optimum use of the collaboration data and the data) Tripety disservent to collaboration ensure the optimum use of the collaboration data and the data) Tripety disservent to collaboration ensure the optimum use of the collaboration data and the data) Tripety disservent to collaboration data and the data