# eJournal of Tax Research

Volume 10, Number 2 October 2012 (Special Edition: Atax 10<sup>th</sup> International Tax Administration Conference)

## CONTENTS

182 Editorial

Margaret McKerchar, Michael Walpole and Binh Tran-Nam

 $184 \quad \text{Tax compliance costs for the small business sector in South Africa} - \\ \text{establishing a baseline}$ 

Sharon Smulders, Madeleing Stiglingh, Riel Franzsen and Lizelle Fletcher


Australian business taxpayer rights to compensation for loss caused by tax official wrongs – a call for legislative clarification

John Bevacqua

250 Findings of tax compliance cost surveys in developing countries

**Jacqueline Coolidge** 





# Findings of tax compliance cost surveys in developing countries

Jacqueline Coolidge\*

#### Abstract

The World Bank Group (WBG) has carried out a numbertax compliance cost surveys (TCCS) for businesses in developing and transition countries infriêta, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East between 2006 and 2011. While there

eJournal of Tax Research

Findings of tax compliance cost surveys in developing countries

The WBG TCCS database, as of end 2011, includes South Africa, Vietnam, Ukraine, Yemen, Peru, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Georgia, Laos, Kenya, Burundi, Bihar and Rajasthan (India), with Uganda and Bandelsh scheduled for early 2012 and several others in the pipeline. A repeat surveyte a some reforms have been enacted) has recently been undertaken for South Africad aone will be carried out in Ukraine in 2012. (See Table below).

Topics covered by the surveys include:

- x core time/cost questions for basia taompliance tasks, usually broken down by:
  - o type of tax (usually income tax, VAT and payroll taxes), and
  - o by type of task (e.g., keeping up date on changes in relevant laws and regulations, collecting finaial information, making tax calculations, filling in tax forms, filling tax returns, making tax payments, responding to queries, being inspected/audited, etc.),
- x bookkeeping practices (e.g., keeping receipts, simplified bookkeeping, full financial accounting, reliance on outsourcing),
- x computer/internet access;
- x experience with inspections/audits;
- x tax morale;
- x tax evasion;
- x perceptions about tax authorities (e.go,mpetence, fairness, consistency, integrity).

Although the various TCCS are difficult to ropare, due to the fact that each was tailored to the particular conditions and **prities** in each country, they allow at least for direct comparison of the time required specific tax compliance tasks in terms of person-hours per year. (For more detailsout survey methodology, please refer to Appendix A).

Section 2 presents illustrative findings regarding the basic time and cost associated with tax compliance. Section 3 discusses **fings** regarding tax inspections and audits. Section 4 focuses on findings on tax morale and perceptions of tax compliance. Section 5 discusses a possible future reseggenda for deeper analysis of the TCCS data.

# List of WBG TCCS and key characteristics

Country	Year of			WBG Reports/Publications based pn
	survey	Respondents	respondents	survey resulfs
South Africa	2006	Tax	2,530	FIAS (2007); Coolidge, et. al. (2008)
		Practitioners		
		(re SMME)		
	2007	SMMEs	1,000	USAID (2008a), Coolidge, et. al,
				(2009)
	2007	Inf. businesses	1,000	USAID (2008b), Coolidge and Ilic
				(2009)
Vietnam	2007	Businesses	874	WB (inputs to country report)
Ukraine	2008	Companies	2,082	IFC (2009)
	2008	Sole	1,000	IFC (2009) draft
		Proprietors		
Yemen	2008	Businesses	950	FIAS (2008) unpublished
	2008	Inf. businesses	s 860	(included in above)
Peru	2009	Tax	1,949	WB (2008) inputs to country report
		Practitioners		
Uzbekistan	2009	Businesses	1,280	IFC (2010)
India (Bihar)	2009	Businesses	1003	IFC 2009
Kenya	2010	Businesses	900	IFC (2011) unpublished
(module)				
	2010	Inf. Businesse	s 600	(included in above)
Armenia	2010	Businesses	750	IFC (2011)
	2010	Sole	250	(included in above)
		Proprietors		
Georgia	2010	SMMEs	820	(no report – findings incorporated in
				project)
Lao PDR	2011	Businesses	800	(no report - findings incorporated i
				project)
Burundi	2011	Businesses	250	(forthcoming)
	2011	Inf. Businesse	s 700	(forthcoming)
Nepal	2011	Businesses	990	(forthcoming)
India	2011	Businesses	929	(forthcoming)
(Rajasthan)				

 $^{3}$  In most cases, the surveys ked respondents about the mresently completed tax year.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> "Tax Practitioners" are externablookkeepers or accountants hired taxpayers to help with tax compliance tasks on a fee-for-service basis or retainer; "Businesses" are active business taxpayers and may sometimes be distinguished between "compar(legal entities) and sole proprietors (physical persons); SMMEs are small, medium and micro-bassines; "inf. Businesses" are informal businesses defined as those not registered for (taut usually with a fixed location).

Number of valid responses for the survey (forptæctitioners, total number of tents about which they reported). For businesses, mosstrvey samples were tratified random samples drawn from the database of active business taxpayæns, designed to be representative.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Also includes USAID reports in caseshere WBG had substantive involvement.

designed to simplify the tax regime, requiree for taxpayers to learn about them. In the case of Armenia, which enacted several british reforms in the year before the survey took place, taxpayers reported sines an average of over 80 hours (above and beyond the amounts reported above) just on learning about the changes.

Of course, there are several caveats and sittlegarding the survey data. Many small business taxpayers find it conceptually diffit to separate tax compliance costs from general bookkeeping, as they tend to carrybookkeeping only to the extent required for tax compliance. Even knowledgeable texperts may disagree with one another about where to draw the line, knowas the "disentanglement problem" fact, Sandford and others have pointed out that there benefits to tax compliance to the extent that small business neagement is improved by diffinancial knowledge gained from tax compliance that wouldn't have happened otherwise. In such an analysis, gross tax compliance costs minus benefits of tax compliance equal net tax compliance costs. This report focuses on gross TCC.

For businesses that outsource some or atheir tax compliance work, the owners are usually unaware of the time spent by eithaccountant, while the accountant usually doesn't know how much time the business spiraternally on such tasks. In countries where almost all tax compliance works done in-house, we would interview businesses directly; in countries where most such work is outsourced, we would interview the tax preparers. In countries where there is a broad mix of the two practices (e.h

The WBG's first TCCS was undexten in 2006 in South Africa, where we estimated TCC of about 5% of turnover for businesseish turnover below \$50,000 and that were registered voluntarily for VAT. Those of similar size not registered for VAT had TCC / turnover of less than 3%.13 (See Figure 1)

Figure 1 Regressivity of Tax Compliance Costs in South Africa

# Compliance Burden for preparation of tax returns as a percent of turnover (firms registered/not registered for VAT; mandatory at R300,000) 6.0% 5.0% 4.0% irms registered for VAT 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% Firms not registered for VAT 0.0% 0.65 0.15 0.3 3.5 10 Turnover (in R million)

# South Africa Tax Compliance Cost Survey

Source: FIAS 2007

Other countries showed even more **exte** TCC burdens for small businesses, although some of the differences may **be** aggerated due to relatively higher estimates of the imputed wages of owner dagers or possibly due to under-reporting of turnover by survey respondents. (See Figure 2).

Here it should be noted that businesses voluntæitjistered for VAT were probably different from similar-sized businesses in other respects, suchunations of employees and neequent implications for payroll and other taxes, so the difference not necessarily be ascribed to VAT alone.





Figure 6: Ways of submitting tax reports in Armenia

# **Enterprises**



# The most recent way of submission, share of enterprises

Source: IFC 2011 [Armenia]

Similarly, in Ukraine, even though diffig is legally possible and many businesses had an internet connection at the timethef TCCS in 2007, relatively few bothered to use it because they were still required to submit hard copies of accompanying documentation, and focus group respondentes tes that they were afraid of the possibility that the tax office could losie Although the relevant tax legislation protects taxpayers who submit required materity registered mail, such protection was either not widely known or trustechuts in the case of Ukraine, even those who used e-filing did not show a significant reduction in tax compliance time, since they still visited the tax office to submithe required hard-copy documentation. On average, business taxpayers made 47 visits/eperto tax offices in Ukraine, which is time-consuming and therefore drives up tax compliance costs.

In Uzbekistan, barely a quarter of businessed accounting software in 2008. Such software reduced the time required for tax accounting by over 80% (from 109 hours per year to 19; see Figure <sup>17</sup>). While e-filing is officially encouraged in Uzbekistan, barely 1% of businesses used it. Askedywhot, most said there were "bugs" in the software sanctioned by the tax office, and that local tax inspectors unofficially discouraged it in favor of bringing returns in physically.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> In other countries, use of computers and softwar**s doe** appear to be associated with such a large reduction in time. Some observers/haspeculated that the availability of tax software facilitates and encourages more "tax planning".

Figure 7: Staff time required for financial reporting and tax compliance in Uzbekistan (staff-

In most countries where we have done a TCCS, the revenue authorities state that their official figures show a much lower rate infspection. In the case of Ukraine, after discussions with the State Tax Committee and focus groups of business accountants, we concluded that the majority of "insections" were in fact brief checks of cash registers. In the case of Kenya, officials from the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) said that many of the short visits were likely "informational visits" by tax officials, which were not inspections at all. However also speculated that there may be some "unofficial visits" or even fraud – i.e., people claiming to be tax inspectors who are not.

The TCCS in Georgia included a breakdown of types of inspections (see Figure 12):

Figure 12 Different types of Tax Inspections in Georgia



Source: IFC (2011) [Georgia]

Definitions of some of the more technical terms in the chart above are as follows:

control of cash registerCheck that cash register isompliance with set standards.

visual inspectionA visual inspection of premises without checking accounting documents, stock, etc.

controlling purchasesTax inspectors buy goods from a store and check if salesperson registers the transaction in cash register and soft period. If not, business is penalized. This is the most frequent form of tax prection (usage of cash registers is a legal requirement).

chronometrage/invigilationTax inspectors monitor sales (of a restaurant or a hotel) for a certain period of time, usually for at least one week. If sales during this period exceed sales from previous period as reported by business; the business gets penalized. Such penalties existed during the survey but have since been abolished.

By way of comparison, we have used the case of South Africa as an example of a country with a well-functioning system of this Based Audit. Overall, small and medium businesses in South Africa in 2006 (those with turnover under about \$2 million) faced only about a 2% chance in spection for Income Tax and Employees taxes and about 3% for VAT. Some of these populous provinces showed a slightly higher likelihood of inspection. (See Figure 13).

Income Tax VAT **Employees Tax** 3.5 4.5 3.5 Northern 0.9 Cape Freestate 3.0 North West 1.9 Mpumalanga 1.5 Gauteng Kwazulu Natal 1.4 Eastern Cape Western Cape 1.6 Limpopo 1.6 Mean by 1.7 respondents provinces

Figure 13 Incidence of Tax Inspections by type of tax and by region – South Africa (2006)

Source: FIAS, (2008)

From the point of view of business taxpayers, any visit from a tax official, no matter the duration or purpose, is a disruption tenthwork schedule and a cause for anxiety. From the point of view of those of us interested in improved governance and transparency, such visits are potential portunities for corruption. The TCCS in Georgia provides some feedback from taxers on some of the consequences of inspections (See Figure 14).


Figure 14 "Negative Consequences" associated with tax inspections\* in Georgia

business owners are legally liable for income tax on all their earlings.

However, businesses also were concerbed tathe disadvantages and costs of staying informal. Many feared government "retribution" legal sanctions, or the need to pay bribes to stay off the tax register. A certain proportion would also usually note that their lack of registration for tax reduced their business opportunities (e.g., ability to sell to formal enterprises or a wider custorbase), their access to finance, or access to other public services.

In the case of Yemen, about half of infoal businesses said they did not face any

Figure 18 Reported incidence of bribes to tax fficials by formal businesses in Yemen (% of respondents)



The TCCS in Yemen displayed evidence both of low tax morale and high levels of perceived tax evasion. Figure 20 beldwws average responses (by turnover band) to standard questions of tax morale. Messprondents were strikingly negative about tax "fairness" and competence, with medium-sized businesses being the most scathing about their trust in the Tax Authority "calculate my taxes accurately."

Figure 20 Tax Morale in Yemen: Agreement with statement, scale 1-5

Source: IFC 2008 [Yemen]

Asked to estimate the percent of the taxes businesses pay that they "get back" through government services, the overall averages wess than 20%. As one might expect, micro-enterprises saw the lowest "retur(17.5%) and large businesses saw the highest (24%). (See Figure 21).

Figure 21 Percent of taxes businesses say the back" through government services in Yemen

Source: IFC 2008 [Yemen]

Yemen also provides further evidence of timk between low tax morale and low tax compliance. Survey respondents were as the aving in mind businesses similar to yours (in the same line of this business, saize, same area), ... what percentage of the taxable profit would you estimate they usually report for tax purposes?" This is less confrontational than asking business owners about their own evasion, but we assume that the response will reflect their own habits. (See Figure 22).

Figure 22 Estimated proportion of profit reported for tax purposes in Yemen





Figure 23 The most popular methods of tax evasion for enterprises in Armenia



Source: IFC 2011 [Armenia]

Declaring only part of the revenue is of course easiest when using cash, so increasing reliance on banks may help mitigate evasionNepal, we asked a series of questions about whether a business had a bank accounif anothe degree to which they relied

In addition, the KRA received relativelygood marks from formal businesses for competence, fairness and helpfulness, while legislation was perceived mostly as clear and transparent (see Figures 27 - 30).

Figure 27 Perception of Kenya Revenue Authority – percent of formal sector businesses rating KRA on the competence of tax officers




Figure 28 Perception of Kenya Revenue Authority – percent of formal sector businesses rating KRA on the helpfulness of tax officers

Figure 29 Perception of Kenya Revenue Authority – percent of formal sector businesses rating KRA on the fairness of tax officers




Figure 30 Perception of clarity of tax laws and regulations in Kenya

Source: IFC (2011) [Kenya]

### 5. FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA

So far, there has been very little researchstatistical analysis of the TCCS data beyond relatively superficial descriptive tistics, as presented in this paper. Two pieces of more in-depth research on the data from South Africa were undertaken: one analyzing the use of outsourcing by small businessed the other examining the demographics and attitudes of informal businesses regarding tax registration.

Plans are currently in train to analyzee that a from as many countries as possible to examine some of the key drivers of TCC that could be improved by reforms in developing countries: specifically, presumptive taxation for small businesses, use of accounting software (compared to manaabounting) and use of e-filing and epayment.

Other ideas being considered include analyzing the effects of Risk Based Audit on tax compliance costs and perceptions, and others d focus more on the effect of tax morale and perceptions, as well as TCG, decisions about tax formalization and compliance. More robust research willedome possible as more countries enact reforms and repeat their TCCS.

Such research is expected to help inform reforms in developing countries that will not only reduce tax compliance costs, but also ourage more informal businesses to register for tax and encourage formal bresises to comply more fully, broadening the tax base and improving a levelaying in business taxation.

# APPENDIX A TCCS METHODOLOGY 21

Common methodological issues include statemple size and sampling methodology. One of the first questions in preparing the CS in each country has always been to figure out how many respondents are nee(steample size). And the answer is "It depends". But a blanket answer "the mortene merrier" is generally misleading.

The mathematics of probability shows that size of the population (e.g., for a country with a business community of several thousand versus many millions) is practically irrelevant to the decision. Thiseans that to achieve a confidence interval of 3% and confidence level of 95% one would need a sample of 1,056 respondents

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Coolidge, Ilic and Kisunko (2009).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Coolidge and Ilic (2009).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Thanks to Gregory Kisunko.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> The margin of error, a.k.a. confidence intervale (plus-or-minus figure uslly a reported in newspaper or television opinion poll results) of 3% tells you that if 55% percent of your sample picks "X" as an answer, you can be "sure" that if you had asthedquestion of the entire relevant population between 52% and 58% would have picked that answer. domefidence level tells you "how sure" you can be,

for a population of 100K and a sample 10067 for a population of 10 million ... and for a population of 100 million. The mechanics of proper sampling are more important.

However, such alternatives usually resimiltess representative data and fewer options for generalization.

Another important factor when choosing the sampling strategy and technique is the capacity of the survey company contracted execute the survey. Planning a complex survey strategy and complicated surveychniques for a contractor with limited survey capacity and ability texecute

### Other variables include:

- x Research agenda;
- x Type of survey (e.g., face-to-face surveys are generally more expensive);
- x Expected coverage (deeper coverage,pægyincial level, etc. = higher cost);
- x Targeted population(s);
- x Level of involvement of the WB state and/or experienced international consultants.

For example, in South Africa, where the cost of skilled labor is extremely high, the survey of 1,000 formal and 1,000 informal businesses cost about \$450,000, while a web-survey that yielded a sample of pv2500 tax practitioners cost less than \$50,000.

The Research agenda usually manifests itself wo ways - in the length/detail of the

# Figure A-2 Roles of Team Members in a TCCS

Project Leader. Is the immediate client of the TCCS (whowsrking closely with the project client – the government). You can compare this to somewho is commissioning a large new building construction. This person may be relatively more or less experienced in this role.

Survey expert Is like the "supervising engineer" for the large building. He/she is responsible for the design and supervision of the construction, according to the needs of the consumer and ensuring both good building standards and appropriate cost control.

Survey company Is like the contractor who actually builds the building. The company should be well qualified and experienced, but they still need supervisoensure they don't cut corners or over-charge the customer.

In other words, good quality and poor quality survern be compared to buildings: if there are flaws (e.g., too much sw [ [ [ [ [si.6( 63u1.7(er. 4)]TJ8g.ite clien)6 b: Is then 2s(ys[si.618 Tcs.7(el73(n)4.6)n98 70.90-4.3(il H6(eSzechun brojvince,s)757(odaw.4( 0.73650 TD -.0013 Tc .[m)11.8(e)-4( bui)ldng) )6(cfll )down a6.4(on]TJ 190

i.5(nk fi8.52o)6 32( e -1.42inomeyne.

#### **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

Allers, M. (1994) "Administrative and Coopliance Costs of Taxation and Public Transfers in the Netherlands", Wolters-Noordhoff, Groningen (dissertation).

Bird R., Martinez-Vazquez and Torgle 20(08) "Tax effort in Developing Countries and High Income Countries: the impact of corruption, voice and accountability", Economic Analysis and Polic yol 8, No. 1, pp 55-71.

Colmar Brunton Social Research Agency, wNZealand, (2005) "Measuring the tax compliance costs of small and medium-sized businesses - a benchmark survey" <a href="http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/nws/archive.php?year=2005&view=383">http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/nws/archive.php?year=2005&view=383</a>

Coolidge, Jacqueline "Tax Compliance Costveys: Using Data to Design Targeted Reforms" World Bank Group, Investment Climate Practice Noteno. 8, Feb. 2010. Available at:http://www

wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/04/19/00033 4955\_20100419043011/Rendered/PDF/560008RI0TaxC10Box345636B01PUBLIC1 .pdf.

Coolidge, J. and Ilic, D. (2009) "Tax Orpliance Perceptions and Formalization of Small Businesses in South Africa," PoliRyesearch Working Paper No. 4992, World Bank, Washington DC. Available at:

http://econ.worldbank.org/external/**def**t/main?pagePK64165259&theSitePK=469 372&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&tetpID=000158349\_20090713114815.

Coolidge, J., Kisunko, G. and Ilic, D. (2009), "Small Businesses in South Africa: Who outsources tax compliance work and whyörld Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4873. World Bank, Washington DC. Available at: http://econ.worldbank.org/external/deft/main?searchTxt=WPS4873&detailMenuPK=64264748&docTY=620265&nenuPK=64264748&pagePK=64166018&piPK=64165415&siteName=EXTDEC&theSitePK=469372.

European Commission (2004) European Tax Survey. Working paper n 3/2004.

Evans, Chris (2003) "Studying the Studies overview of recent research into taxation operation costs", eJournal of Tax Research, Vol. 1, No. 1.

FIAS (2007) 'SME Taxation: A Toolkit for Practitione's

FIAS (2007) "South Africa: Tax Compliance Burden for Small Businesses: A Survey of Tax Practitioners," available at: http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/fias.nsf/Attac/mentsByTitle/South\_Africa\_Tax\_Practitioners\_Report.pdf.

FIAS (2008) "Tax Compliance Costs for Small Businesses in South Africa; Web-Survey of Tax Practitioners; Provincial Data Analysis" available at: http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/fias.nsf/AttacmentsByTitle/SouthAfricaTaxComplianceCosts2008/\$FILE/South+Africa+Tax+Compliance+Costs1.pdf.

FIAS (2008) "Yemen Tax Cost of Compliance Survey" (unpublished manuscript).

FIAS (2009) "Yemen: Designing a new SMEgime: Analysis of compliance cost survey data" (unpublished manuscript).

Godwin, M. (1995) "The compliance costs of the United Kingdom tax system" alon: Compliance Costs - Measurement and Pollogeth: Fiscal Publications in association with The Institute for Fiscal Studies.

Hasseldine, J; C T Sandford; Jeff Pope; Chris Evans (2010ab)ation Compliance Costs: A Festschrift for Cedric Sandfordst Leonards, N.S.W.: Prospect Media.

IFC (2009)The Costs of Tax Compliance in UkrairAvailable at: <a href="http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/fias.nsf/AttaomentsByTitle/PublicationCR\_CostofTaxCompliance">http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/fias.nsf/AttaomentsByTitle/PublicationCR\_CostofTaxCompliance</a> Ukraine.pdf

IFC (2010)Tax Compliance and Reporting Costs for Businesses in Uzbekistan. At: http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/uzbeksme.nsf/Content/Home.

IFC (2011) IFC Tax Perception and Compliance Cost Surveys: A Tool for Tax Reform World Bank Group, March 2011. Available at: https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/loads/TPCCS\_Consolidated\_Web.pdf.

IFC (2011)The Costs of Tax Compliance in ArmerAsailable at: https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/advisory-services/regulatory-simplification/business-regulation/businesserations/upload/Armenia-Report-Cost-of-tax-compliance.pdf.

IFC (2011) "Georgia Tax Compliance Cost Survey 2010" Power-point presentation.

OECD (2001) "Compliance Measurement - Practice Note".

OECD (2012) "Reducing the Tax Compliance Burden".

Sandford, C. (1994), "International Compsons of Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation", Australian Tax Forum.

Sandford, C. (ed.), (1995) Taxation ropliance Costs: Measurement and Policy, Fiscal Publications. Bath.

Sandford, C., Godwin, M. and Hardwid, (1989) Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation, Fiscal Publications, Bath.

Slemrod, Joel and Varsha Venkatesh, (20072)e Income Tax Compliance Cost of Large and Mid-Size Businesses", University Michigan, Ross School of Business Working Paper Series No. 914.

Smulders, Sharon (2012 forthcoming) "Stoutfrica Small Business Tax Compliance Cost Survey 2011".

Torgler, B. and F. Schneider (2007) had ow Economy, Tax Morale, Governance and Institutional Quality: A panel Analysis", Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Working Paper No. 2007 – 2.

USAID (2008), "Formal SMME Tax compliance Survey Report: Prepared for National Treasury Republic Stouth Africa", available at: http://www.fias.net/ifcext/fias.nsf/Content/Pubs BusinessTaxation

USAID (2008), "Informal SMME Tax Survey Report: Prepared for National Treasury Republic of South Africa", available at: http://www.fias.net/ifcext/fias.nsf/Content/Pubs\_BusinessTaxation

World Bank (2008) "Spending for Results - A Public Expenditure Review for Peru".

Wurts, Brian (1995). Report on the Plamondon Compliance Cost Study for the Canadian Goods and Servicesx. Tan Cedric Sandford, edT,ax Compliance Costs: Measurement and Policy (Fiscal Publication 299–320.